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The importance of taxation in management of firm is large
and growing. Alvarez and Marsal (2012) declare that tax
topics are considered by financial executives in up to 92% of
global business decisions. Recently, a great deal of effort has
focused on the relationship between tax optimization and the
firm's value. According to Capiez (1994) “tax optimization
consists in minimizing mainly the income tax in order to
maximize the result after taxes”. In the same way Bryant-
Kutcher, Guenther, and Jackson (2012) show that tax optimi-
zation interest managers to reduce tax burden and maximize
level of profits. In this framework, we identified tax optimi-
zation in terms of legal activity such as minimizing the taxable
base for investment and financing. The interest granted to the
firm's tax situation and the controversies concerning the firm's
tax burdens (the tax rate is about 30% in Tunisia) and the firm's* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: assidisoufiene@yahoo.fr (S. Assidi).
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).growth led us to examine the relationship between tax opti-
mization and the firm's value.
The specific nature of the Tunisian tax system, with the
many opportunities granted by the legislator, suggested that
this context constituted a favourable ground for conducting
this study. In this framework, we identified tax optimization in
terms of legal activity such as minimizing the taxable base for
investment and financing.
The main objective of tax optimization is the creation of the
firm's value and this is linked directly to both the planning and
the quality of the firm's managerial organization. Manager
look for strategies to reduce their tax burden to generate tax
benefits after tax returns or shareholder wealth (Abdul Wahab
& Holland, 2012).
There have been many debates about the practice of tax
optimization and its impact on the firm's value. Chadefaux and
Rossignol (2006) considered that tax optimization was one of
the factors which were likely to increase the firm's value either
by the minimization of tax burdens or through the disclosure
of good information. Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012) revealting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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optimization levels.
Nevertheless, some researchers found that the activity of
tax optimization was perceived to have a destructive impact on
the firm's value (MacNaughton & Mawani, 1997; Nanik &
Ratna, 2015). This was because, while tax optimization
minimized the firm's tax burdens, it exposed the firm to
financial difficulties since no account was taken of the firm's
non-tax costs. In the same context, they showed that the
optimization of the taxable income influenced the interests of
other stakeholders.
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) showed that the relationship
between the activity of tax optimization and the firm's value
remained unclear. Although several studies have investigated
the implication of tax avoidance on the firm's value, we still do
not understand fully the mechanisms underlying the associa-
tion between tax avoidance and the firm's value.
In our research, we used the concept of value from the
shareholders' viewpoint. Our purpose was to investigate the
relationship between the tax optimization and the creation of
shareholder value.
Previous research on the valuation of firms did not examine
clearly the empirical implications of the firm's value on tax
avoidance activities. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to
add to the growing literature on the implications of corporate
tax optimization on the firm's value in the context of a
developing country such as Tunisia.
This paper is organized as follows: in the first section, we
present the literature review and, therefore, the hypotheses for
our study. In the second section, we present the sample and the
firms 'data. In the third section, we validate our hypotheses
empirically. Finally, we present our conclusions.
2. Previous literature and development of hypotheses
In this section, we examine the relevant literature on tax
optimization and the firm's value. Also, we explain the re-
lationships between firm value and earnings management,
investment, financing, audit quality and size.2.1. Tax optimization and the firm's valueThe classic theoretical literature on firm valuation (Feltham
& Ohlson, 1995) and their empirical applications (Barth,
Clinch, & Shibano, 1999; Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 1998;
Kothari, 2001) used typically after-tax earnings and did not
address any influences of corporate tax avoidance on firm
value.
The taxpayers' behaviours vary from conscious tax plan-
ning, tax optimization and tax avoidance to tax evasion and tax
fraud; these represent illegal activities penalized by law (Alm,
Cherry, Jones, & Mckee, 2010). More recent US research
suggested further costs in the form of agency costs; these led
shareholders to discount the firm value by reference to levels
of tax planning activities (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006).
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) did not validate the simple
assumption of transfer of wealth from the state toshareholders. They proposed the incorporation of the agency
theory in analyzing tax avoidance. They concluded that,
amongst the retained theoretical framework, there were
considerable differences between theoretical and empirical
results. As advocated by Slemrod (2004) and Desai and
Dharmapala (2009), a simplified model with perfect agents
(managers) entails distinct conclusions as compared to a
model treating an agency theory.
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) found that the effect of tax
avoidance on firm value depended on firm governance. They
concluded that the global effect of tax avoidance was insig-
nificant and that it had a more positive effect on well-governed
firms than on poorly governed firms.
In the context of the United Kingdom, Abdul Wahab and
Holland (2012) found that, regardless of the presence of
corporate governance mechanisms, there was a negative rela-
tionship between the intensity of tax planning and a firm's
value. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Hanlon and Slemrod
(2009) demonstrated that firm characteristics played a crucial
role in determining the influence of tax avoidance on the firm's
value. Koester (2011) considered that the governance structure
moderated the relationship between tax avoidance and the
firm's value.
Previous studies on taxes and the firm's value assumed a
linear relationship between tax planning and the market-to-
book ratio (De Simone & Stomberg, 2013). Jacob and
Schu¨tt (2014) studied two dimensions of tax avoidance such
as the uncertainty and the expected level of future tax rates.
They concluded that, for firms with effective tax avoidance,
pre-tax earnings had a considerable impact on a firm's value. In
addition, firms, with volatile effective tax rates, received a
discount on their earnings.
In this study, we used Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) as a
proxy of tax optimization.
Following the same line of thought as previous research, we
tested the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a negative association between ETR and firm's
value.2.2. Earnings management and the firm's valueEarnings management can be opportunistic or efficient; it
relates to the manager's behaviour in using accounting
methods. Most previous researches concentrated on the
opportunistic perspective and considered that earnings man-
agement was a way of wealth expropriation from shareholders
to managers. Therefore, opportunistic earnings management
might have a negative influence on the firm's performance
(Cormier & Martinez, 2006; Ettredge, Xu, & Yi, 2014; Louis
& White, 2006).
Many researchers, such as Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009)
and Wilson (2009) in the American context, found that firms,
which practised earnings management, realized simulta-
neously an increase in their value. Frank et al. (2009) exam-
ined the relationship between financial and tax reporting
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planning and earnings management.
Managers may take advantages of the tax incentives gran-
ted by the law in order to reduce their accounting income. In
the Tunisian context, there is a connection between accounting
income and tax income. Therefore, taxable income can be
reduced. Assidi and Omri (2014) showed that tax optimization
could improve the information quality within the firm. In the
same order of ideas, the traditional visions of tax optimization
suggest that a firm's value should increase with the practice of
tax optimization. Therefore, we tested the following
hypothesis:
H2: The firm's value increases if there is an increase in the
sum of total accruals.2.3. Financial debt and the firm's valueThe financial debt represents a major source of financing
for the firm. Modigliani and Miller (1963) presented the
seminal work which hypothesized that the tax benefits of debt
increased firm value and reduced the cost of using debt
capital. In the same order of ideas, the tax perspective con-
siders that financial debt is a tax source of benefit to the firm.
Indeed, the interest, being fiscally deductible, allows the tax
burdens to be minimized and to increase subsequently the
firm's value. Based on the trade-off theory, Lim (2011)
showed that there was a negative correlation between debt
and tax rates.
Financial debt equals financial debt divided by equity
(Guenther, 1994). Therefore, we tested the following
hypothesis:
H3: Debt has a negative effect on the firm's value.2.4. Firm investmentInvestment is the fundamental source of firm value and of
economic growth. A stable environment helps a firm to invest.
Income taxes can play a significant role in the managers'
decision-making concerning the investment. The amounts,
report and, even, the uncertainty of the payment of tax burdens
affect the calculation of the firm's net present value and,
consequently, the decision on investment. Besides, tax in-
centives can interact potentially with financial returns and can
affect the firm's decisions on investments (Hanlon &
Heitzman, 2010). In the Tunisian context, the state promul-
gated the code of incentives and granted benefits to firms to
increase these values. Also, the firm's value is no longer in-
dependent of factors which create corporate value. Indeed,
Frank (2002) signalled that the economic circumstances, such
as investment, played a considerable role in the determination
of the firm's value. Therefore, we tested the following
hypothesis:H4: Investment has a positive influence on the firm's value.2.5. Audit qualityThe audit quality is a necessary element in guaranteeing the
relevance and reliability of the decision making process. The
auditors' affiliation to international BIG 4 firms plays an
important role in the valorization of the firm. According to De
Angelo (1981), BIG 4 firms offer better quality services
because they have competent and informed teams.
Sulong, Gardner, Hussin, Mohd Sanusi, and McGowan
(2013) revealed that audit quality had a significant and
negative impact on a firm's performance. The authors used the
sum of audit fees, paid to the auditors, as proxy of audit
quality. Their results were inconsistent with the findings of
previous studies which confirmed that audit quality was
associated with higher performance. We highlight that the
retained measure of audit quality has a considerable differ-
ential effect on the nature of the links between the variables in
question.
The Tunisian firms are obliged to designate an auditor who
belongs to the Institute of Chartered Accountants; this ensures
the transparency of the published information.
Bouaziz and Triki (2012) studied the audit committee's
effect on financial performance in the Tunisian context. In
particular, they underlined the audit committee's character-
istics such as its independence, the members' expertise and
its size. Their findings showed that the audit committee's
attributes enhanced the performances of Tunisian listed
firms.
Many studies1 used Big 4 firms rather than Non-Big 4 firms
to approximate audit quality. Therefore, we tested the
following hypothesis:
H5: Audit quality has a positive effect on the firm's value.2.6. Sector of activityBelonging to a well determined sector, it can help the firm
to benefit from certain tax advantages and can influence, also,
the firm's value. Several researchers noted the importance of
the sector of activity in increasing the firm's value
(Christopher, Armstronga, & Blouina, 2012; Janssen, Crabbe,
& Vanenbussche, 2005; Omer, Molloy, & Ziebart, 1993;
Zimmerman, 1983).
From an empirical point of view, Omer et al. (1993)
detected a significant difference between firms in the indus-
trial sector and firms carrying out their activities in other
sectors. Similarly, Janssen et al. (2005) concluded that effec-
tive tax rates varied between sectors. In addition, in the
Tunisian context, the tax benefits and the minimum amount of
tax depends on the firm's sector of activity. Indeed, we1 Bauwhede et al., 2000; Zhou & Elder, 2001.
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factor on tax optimization. Therefore, we tested the following
hypothesis:
H6: The firm's value depends on the sector of activity.2.7. Firm sizePrevious empirical research studies found that there was a
positive relationship between firm size and corporate perfor-
mance (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009). In contrast, in the Amer-
ican context, Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) confirmed the
existence of a negative relationship between the firm's size and
the firm's value. Several previous works indicated that the total
assets could be considered to be an indicator of the firm's size
(Zhou, 1999; Zimmerman, 1983).
In conducting our research, we referred to the works of
Wilson (2008) who measured the firm's size by the natural
logarithm of the book value of total assets. The econometric
transformation to the logarithm allowed us to avoid the
problem of stationary of the variables. Since large size firms
are subject to larger transfers of wealth, we anticipated that,
for the Tunisian firms, the firm's size increased the firm's value.
Next, we tested the following hypothesis:
H7: Size has a significant and positive effect on the firm's
value.
3. Methodology
In this section, we present our data and the sample selection
of our research along with the dependent variables and in-
dependents variables. Likewise, we present the model, the
descriptive analysis, the statistical tests and the results of the
estimations.3.1. Data and selection of sampleOur empirical study covered a sample of Tunisian firms
over an 11 year period. We began with a sample of all
Tunisian listed and non-listed firms during the years from
2000 to 2010. We chose these eleven years because they
represented the most recent years for which financial state-
ment data were currently available. For the listed firms, we
collected the data from the financial statements and the stock
market data published by the financial market council.
However for non-listed firms, we collected the data from the
accounting services of the firm itself. We excluded firms
belonging to the financial sector (such as banking, insurance
and investment firms) and real estate firms because of their
accounting and tax specificities. Indeed, these firms are
required to submit to sectorial standards techniques whereby
the financial accounting techniques are different from those
other industrial, commercial and services firms. We excluded,
also, the firms, which exported totally, because they wererequired to submit to a particular tax regime such as income
tax exemption.3.2. Dependent variable
3.2.1. Firm value
The literature recommended several measurement in-
struments such as accounting measures, namely, Return on
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) and Stock Ex-
change measures (Q of Tobin value).
In this study, we measured firm value by using ROA; this
was calculated by the net profit on the total assets. Notably, in
the American context, Dodd and Chen (1996) showed that
ROA was the most efficient measure of the firm's value. Also,
this measure has a relationship between tax benefits accorded
by the state and corporate assets which represent factors of the
creation of value. This ratio also represents companies' prof-
itability level from their business transaction activities
(Santoro & Wei, 2011).
In the following, we present a brief description of the
explanatory variables used in our research.3.3. Independent variablesEffective Tax Rate (ETR): tax income divided by income
before taxes. Several recent pieces of research (e.g. Aliani,
2014; Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2010; Wilson, 2009)
used this measure as a proxy of tax minimization activities.
Total accruals: equal the difference between the firm's
income and cash flow.
Financial debt: financial debt divided by equity (Guenther,
1994).
Investment: gross change in tangible assets (Tang & Firth,
2010).3.4. Control variablesBIG: 1 if the firm is audited by a Big Four company and
0 otherwise (Bouaziz & Triki, 2012).
SECTOR: 1 if the firm belongs to the industrial sector and
0 otherwise (Christopher et al., 2012).
SIZE: logarithm of the book value of total assets (Wilson,
2008)3.5. Model presentationIn accordance with the micro-economic and classical
financial theory, we found that firm performance was valorized
by managerial choice. Therefore, tax optimization was a
means of creating value by applying all available means and
strategies. We developed the following model to present the
relationship between tax optimization and the firm's value:
ROAit ¼ a0þ b1ETRit þ b2ACCTit þ b3DEBTit þ b4DINVit
þ b5BIGit þ b6SECTORit þ b7SIZEit þ 3it
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
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sample composed of 385 observations (35 firms).ETR ACC DEB INV SECT SIZ BIG
ETR 1.003.6. Descriptive analysis
ACC 0.23 1.00
DEB 0.04 0.13 1.00
INV 0.01 0.05 0.06 1.00
SEC 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 1.00
SIZ 0.009 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.39 1.00
BIG 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.19 0.31 1.00
Table 4
Hausman test.
Coefficients Difference Standard error
ETR 0.111 0.070 0.040 e
DET 0.404 0.512 0.107 0.034
INV 0.007 0.004 0.002 e
BIG 0.123 0.265 0.141 0.161
ACC 0.19 0 0.160 0.024 0.003




Independent variables Coefficients Z P
ETR 0.015 4.12 0.000
ACC 0.019 11.07 0.000
DET 0.017 4.08 0.000
INV 0.005 2.18 0.030
BIG 0.002 0.23 0.819
SEC 0.073 3.32 0.000From Table 1, we found that, in our sample, the average
effective tax rate was 21.1%. This percentage was below the
Tunisian statutory tax rate (30%). In fact, we considered that
the average performance of tax optimization of Tunisian firms
was significant.
As regards the variable earnings management, we found
that 2.8% of the firms managed their earnings; this explained
the relationship between the earnings management and the
firm's value.
For the financial debt, we noted that this was, on average,
55%; this showed that the Tunisian firms had significant levels
of debt which minimized their values. Indeed, the average of
the corporate investment was of the order of 2.69%; this
showed that investment and tax benefits increased the firm's
value. The variable size generated an average of 81.91%. This
value suggested that the Tunisian firms, selected in our sam-
ple, were large in size; this played a role in the firm's value.
In Table 1 below, we show the descriptive statistics of our
variables.
As shown in Table 2, the results indicate that 62.06% of
firms belonged to the industrial sector. This demonstrated the
importance of this sector to Tunisian economic life and the
weight of the tax placed on the industrial firms. The frequency
of commercial and services firms were 20.69% and 17.25%
respectively. This led us to conclude that the value of theTable 1
Panel A: Variable definitions
Variables Definition Measures
ETR Effective tax rate Income tax/profit before tax
Accruals Total accruals Net income e cash flow
Size Total assets Log total assets
DINV Change in property Gross change in tangible assets
DEBT Debt Financial debt/equity
AUDIT Audit 1 if the firm is audited by a
Big Four company and 0 otherwise
SECTOR Sector of activity 1 industry 0 otherwise
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of quantitative variables
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard error
Effective tax rate 0.000 0.431 0.218 1.480
Accruals 7.829 10.080 0.028 2.174
Debt 0.990 4.120 0.553 2.127
Investment 5.730 3.190 1.922 12.059




Sector of activity Industrial 62.06%
Commercial 20.69%
Service 17.25%
Audit quality BIG 43.89%
NBIG 56.10%
SIZ 0.018 5.99 0.000
CONSTANT 1.175 20.37 0.000
Prob > F ¼ 0.000industrial firms was more important than that of commercial
and services firms.
According to Table 2, our sample shows a frequency of
43.89%. This result explains that almost half of the studied
firms were not audited by the BIG 4; this raised the problem of
the relationship between the BIG 4 and firm value.
As presented in Table 3, the correlation matrix of the
explanatory variables shows that there is a moderate correla-
tion of the variables. We noted the absence of strong corre-
lations which might bias our results. We verified, also, the
degree of correlation between the ETR and the accruals on the
one hand and, on the other hand, between the ETR and the
other variables. This was because a strong correlation between
the variables could influence the nature of the relationship
between the firm's value, as measured by the economic prof-
itability, and the other variables.3.7. Statistical tests and results of estimationsThe Hausman test result (Table 4) shows that the likelihood
is 0.00 per cent which is less than 5%. Therefore, this statistic
allowed us to choose the fixed effect model.
Table 6
Estimation results after decomposing the sample.
Variables Listed firms Non-listed firms
Coefficient Z P Coefficient Z P
ETR 0.013 4.48 0.00 0.213 4.48 0.00
ACC 0.014 9.31 0.00 0.021 3.75 0.001
DEB 0.017 3.77 0.00 0.012 1.52 0.13
INV 0.004 0.16 0.87 0.005 0.04 0.30
BIG 0.002 0.32 0.75 e e e
SEC 0.038 3.20 0.00 0.51 1.54 0.13
SIZ 0.005 1.41 0.15 0.02 4.71 0.00
CONS 0.95 14.23 0.00 1.16 13.55 0.00
Prob > F ¼ 0.000 Prob > F ¼ 0.000
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independent and dependents variables of our model. The
effective tax rate correlated negatively and significantly with
the firm's economic profitability. This shows that the minimi-
zation of the tax rate has a direct impact on the firm's profit-
ability. This result corroborated both Desai and Dharmapala's
(2009) work and confirmed our theoretical hypothesis.
Despite, the different context the minimization of tax burden
remains ultimate objective for all company in word. Then, in
making their decisions, managers have to take account of the
after tax consequences.
In our sample, the coefficient of the accruals variable is
positive and statistically significant. It followed that most of
manager used earnings management upwards for different
objectives. In our context, the firms had a high concentration
of ownership. In fact, in the American context, Warfield,
Wild, and Wild (1995) proved, also, this positive relation-
ship between the firm's economic value and the firm's earn-
ings management. This result confirm in the majority of all
context because manager every time look for personnel
wealth.
The investment had an immediate effect on the value for a
coefficient of 0.05. It was considered to be an investment
oriented towards the productive or the material yield. The
investment is correlated positively with economic profitability.
Therefore, it represented a factor in the creation of value and
the extension and development of firms. This might be
explained by the socio-politic stability, favourable environ-
ment for investment and low risk.
The coefficient of the debt variable is negative and statis-
tically significant, this result confirm with Hovakimian (2006).
It is the short-term debt rather than the investment cycle which
was intended to finance the operating cycles or the banking
competition. Consequently, it has a negative effect on eco-
nomic profitability because of the importance of the financial
charge. Also, the firm used short-term debts to compensate for
the financial disequilibrium.
The sector variable was significant and this validated our
hypothesis. The choice of sector of activity is a necessary
element which helps the firm to create value (Christopher
et al., 2012).
The industrial sector creates better value than firms in the
other sectors. This result explains by the benefits and in-
centives which the State allowed the industrial sector.
The coefficient of the size variable is positive and statisti-
cally significant; this validated our hypothesis. This raised the
problem of increasing return to scale. In our sample, there
were social problems such as the large wage bills. The Tuni-
sian firms were inefficient since they did not have the econ-
omies of scale.
In order to determine the effect of the Stock Exchange
listing on firm value, we split our sample into two separate
sub-samples (24 firms listed and 11 firms non-listed). The first
one included the listed firms and the second contained the
listed firms. The Hausman test revealed that the listed firms
had a random effect, whilst, on the other hand, those unlisted
displayed a fixed effect. The logic of this result was likelybecause the publicly traded firms were more exposed to
different cyclical phenomena which affected their market
prices.
According to Table 6, the coefficient of the effective tax
rate of listed firms is significant and negative. This coefficient
is more important than the coefficient of non-listed firms. This
can be explained by these firms' abilities to optimize their tax
policies in order to maximize their values. The listed firms are
subject to the regulatory constraints and controls which are the
responsibility of their managers. Consequently, the non-listed
firms are less liable to have the opportunities of tax optimi-
zations due to the absence of the strict application of the tax
rules and the absence of professionals able to optimize the tax
burdens. In addition, the estimation results showed that the
debt was the variable; this allowed the listed firms to better
achieve tax optimization since, compared to non-listed firms,
they had more chances to access debt.
The sector of activity was significant for the publicly traded
firms whereas it was insignificant for the non-listed firms. In
effect, the industrial listed firms created better value than other
sectors.
In effect, when there was favourable financial leverage, a
part of the firm's generated value was transferred to the State in
the form of tax. On the other hand, in the presence of negative
financial leverage, the State takes on a part of the burden since
the financial losses of the exercises were deferred to the
following fiscal year.
4. Conclusion
The main interest of this work is to examine the relation-
ship between tax optimization and the firm's value. Specif-
ically, we underlined the factors, which could be related
intimately to effective tax rates and influenced the firm's value.
We stressed the audit quality, earnings management, debt,
sector of activity. To demonstrate such an effect, we used a
sample of Tunisian listed and non-listed firms for a period
from 2000 to 2010.
The results showed that there was a negative relationship
between corporate tax optimization and firm value for Tunisia
firms. This shows that the minimization of the tax rate had a
direct impact on the firm's profitability.
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the results to increase the benefits from new sources of
funding, the accruals had a positive impact on the firm's value.
Debt had a negative impact on the firm; this showed that the
indebtedness of Tunisian firms was oriented to the financial
operating cycle. However, investment had a positive impact on
the firm's value. The sector of activity was significant; this was
explained by the importance of the industrial sector to the
creation of the firm's value. The firm's size had a positive
impact on its economic performance; this was consistent with
the political theory which showed that, if the firm's size
increased, the firm's value increased, also.
After dividing the sample between listed and non-listed
firms, our results showed that the listed firms were better
able to optimize tax by adopting a tax policy and creating
value. The sector of activity was significant for the publicly
traded firms whereas it was insignificant for non-listed firms.
Indeed, the listed firms, operating in the industrial sector,
created better value than firms in the other sectors.
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